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What reason for the question mark? Because
the current crisis consists of at least four
stages. They had been and are still manifesting
themselves with shifts in time. Even new waves
cannot be ruled out, either by the returning of
previous stages or by experiencing new poten-
tial crisis waves still ahead of us. For the defini-
tion of different stages, the first level of the cri-
sis is financial, the second macroeconomic, the
third social and the fourth ideology and men-
tality-related. What did we really leave behind?
It is certainly the financial crisis, at least its first
big wave. However, everybody knows that, on
the one hand, substantial bubbles have still
remained in the global financial system, while,
on the other hand, new bubbles had been aris-
ing, not least due to the management of the cri-
sis. The fact that part of the previously idle
capacities have been reincorporated into pro-
duction indicates that the macroeconomic cri-
sis may have been overcome and become part
of the fragile recovery started in 2010.
Nevertheless, unused and uncompetitive
capacities have still remained. Nobody has yet
performed the task of the next period, to either
abolish them, or, according to a more opti-
mistic view, include them into a successful
structural transformation process. This remark
does not only address the unused physical
capacities but, also, a substantial part of the
labour market as well.
It has to be emphasized that, in global com-
parison, the „returned growth” reveals a rather
mixed picture. While large part of the emerging
countries were able to overcome the crisis suc-
cessfully and with additional (continuous)
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growth, recovery in the developed world seems
to be much more modest. This is particularly
true to most member countries of the
European Union. In several EU countries not
only is growth expected to be very slow but a
further decline or a long stagnating period will
have to be reckoned with.
Social and labour-market-related impacts,
representing the third level of the crisis, have
emerged with full impact in the period between
2010 and 2012. 
Finally, as far as the fourth level, namely the
mental preparedness, crisis resistance and crisis
solving capacity and readiness of the respective
societies, signs of serious concern can be regis-
tered. One of the obvious forms is the inward-
looking attitude of the population that can be
observed in several EU member countries. This
is in sharp contrast to the basic economic facts
originating from the degree of openness and
high level of involvement of the respective
economies international division of labour. It
was just this economic reality that made possi-
ble the return to positive economic growth and
the negative welfare effects of the crisis could
be kept at a minimum. The lack or the percep-
tible decline of solidarity, both within the soci-
ety of the individual member countries and
among member countries constituting to
European integration can be considered as an
alarming signal not just for economic consider-
ations. Trends towards exclusion have marked-
ly increased. Populism and demagogy, both
ignoring fundamental economic realities,
gained ground, with already short-term, very
serious and costly consequences. Still, it can be
mentioned as a positive element that, in most
member countries, the above processes have
still remained under control.
Following this short introduction, I would
like to address three issues: global develop-
ments, the European Union and some remarks
to the current situation and tasks for the
Hungarian economy.
GLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE MIRROR OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT
In the beginning, attention was turned to the
fact that, between 2008 and 2010, different
countries opted for crisis management with
sometimes rather different policy instruments
– provided they had such instruments at their
disposal. Following the dramatic decline of
GDP caused by the crisis, the leading
economies of the world started to experience a
unanimous recovery but with different speed.
This positive development should not hide the
fact that the „post-crisis” period is still bur-
dened with question marks and financial bub-
bles. Several experts consider such a bubble the
Chinese housing market (despite the fact that
its structural substantially differs from that of
Spain, Ireland or the USA), the future of the
Eurozone or the management of the budget
deficit and the accumulated debt of the United
States.
Following an unprecedented collapse in 2008
and a not so unprecedented dynamism in 2010
the return of global trade returning to the pre-
crisis level within one year is a definitely an
encouraging phenomenon. Similarly, although
with some delay, welcoming signs can be
observed in employment as well. The potential
mental „pollution” derived from the crisis may
become the „crisis product” of the next few
years but will not be addressed here as it does
not fall into the key area of my work. (Still, it
seems to be more important to undertake the
necessary steps to get prepared for the manage-
ment of this problem in all countries, particu-
larly in Europe.)
When comparing the depth of the crisis in
2009 and the years needed to bring back the
economic performance (measured in GDP) to
the pre-crisis level, we face a varied picture.
Some countries did not experience crisis at all,
at least with their economic growth, even if it
temporarily slowed down, it remained (highly) PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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positive (see China). It is more interesting to
look at the developed economies and how
quickly they can be able to overcome the
growth-related impact of the crisis. Based on
statistical figures of GDP growth (which, defi-
nitely, is not the only and unanimously shared
criterion), the national product of the USA
already returned in 2010 to the level of 2008 (as
well as Turkey). In contrast, and based on most
recent forecasts, the EU-27 may need three
years to reach the 2008 level, due both to the
sharp decline of GDP in 2009 and the sluggish
recovery started in 2010. In addition, the 27
member countries indicate rather different per-
formances. Poland’s economic growth, the
only one in the EU-27, did not stop in 2009,
and even shows an additional acceleration. In
contrast, six member countries of the EU will
require two years, and another six countries
three years to reach the 2008 level of GDP .
Moreover, according to the forecast of the
IMF, there are ten other member countries that
are expected to need more than three years to
return to the GDP level of 2008. Not surpris-
ingly, this group includes the most crisis-ridden
Baltic countries, the well-known „sick mem-
bers” of the Eurozone, but also Italy and,
among the new member countries, Romania
and Slovenia, or Croatia waiting for accession
in 2013. Providing there is a healthy and sus-
tainable economic policy, Hungary could
bounce back to the 2008 level in three years,
2012 (see Table 1).
In contrast to previous, largely modest and
non-global (regional) recessions of the last two
years, in 2009 it was the global trade that prac-
tically collapsed. In previous periods, interna-
tional trade used to prove a „mitigating factor”
of the crisis. This however was not the case
during the most recent and deepest crisis.  On
the average, the GDP of developed countries
declined by 3.4 per cent (that of the EU-27
4.1per cent). It was accompanied (and to a large
extent caused or deepened) by the shrinking of
global trade by about 20per cent. There were
several countries registering even larger falls of
exports (and of imports). In this situation, the
question was raised whether the export-orient-
ed growth pattern that had been characterizing
the successful catching-up process in many
countries, including the large majority of the
Central and Eastern European that underwent
democratic changes and transformation into
market economies (and was a backbone of the
unprecedented rise of China’s economic
power), can be sustained. Or, a „change of pat-
tern” is unavoidable so that sustainable devel-
opment in the future would require a sharp
turn from the export-driven to a demand-driv-
en growth.
Before going into some details of crisis man-
agement, two issues have to be stressed. First:
it was the very strong interdependence among
national economies that had been established in
the last decades – not least as a result of the
global network of transnational companies –
that raised a barrier to each country to opt for
national trade protectionism that had definite-
ly deepened the crisis of 1929 to 1933. It is not
unlikely that just the crisis of 2009 made peo-
ple aware of the political and economic leader-
ship of several countries and the fact that it is
impossible to leave the interdependent system
without huge costs, because each individual ini-
tiative would have led to very grave and sudden
market-driven retaliation. This rational think-
ing, of course, does not mean the world econo-
my could have been saved from different pro-
tectionist endeavours. We can identify such
efforts in industrial policy, in international
finance and, sometimes, even in trade, but par-
ticularly in the economic policies of several
countries facing the crisis and trying to find
national solutions in the first stage of crisis
management of the EU member countries. No
doubt that the quick reaction to the crisis and
the following economic recovery have con-
tributed to prevent further protectionist prac- PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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Table 1
REAL GDP GROWTH (IN %) AND YEARS OF RETURNING TO PRE-CRISIS LEVEL
(2008=100)
Country 2009 2010/2009* 2011/2009* 2012/2009* Number  of 
years
World –0.5 104.5 1
Advanced economies –3.4 101.9 2
Emerging and developing economies 2.7 0
USA –2.6 100.1 1
Japan –6.3 100.8 3
China 9.2 0
Europe –4.5 100.1 2
EU-27 –4.1 101.5 3
Eurozone –4.1 100.9 3
• Austria –3.9 101.2 2
• Belgium –2.7 101.3 2
• Estonia –13.9 (95.1) More
• Finland –8.2 100.0 3
• France –2.5 100.5 2
• Germany –4.7 101.1 2
• Greece –2.0 (91.8) More
• Ireland –7.6 (93.7) More
• Italy –5.2 (98.4) More
•Netherlands –3.9 100.7 3
• Portugal –2.5 (96.9) more
• Slovakia –4.8 102.8 2
• Slovenia –8.1 (97.1) More
• Spain –3.7 (98.5) More
• Czech R. –4.1 102.7 3
• Denmark –5.2 100.7 3
• Sweden –5.3 103.7 2
• United K. –4.9 100.2 3
• Bulgaria –5.5 100.9 3
• Hungary –6.7 (99.8) Just
• Latvia –18.0 (87.8) More
• Lithuania –14.7 (93.8) More
• Poland 1.7 0
• Romania –7.1  (97.2) More
• Croatia –5.8 (95.8) More
• Serbia –3.1 101.6 2
• Turkey –4.7 103.1 1
• Russia –7.8 100.5 2
• Ukraine –14.8 (97.3) More
*base year 2009 (=100)
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 2011 and own calculations PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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tices that could have seriously endangered the
future of international trade in general, and its
possible dramatic collapse. Fortunately, just the
opposite happened. In 2010, as compared to
2009, global trade produced a unique recovery
and exports became the unquestionable driving
force of positive, even if modest, overall
growth. Making reference to statistics: in 2009,
world exports declined by 23 per cent, while in
2010 they grew by 22 per cent, as compared to
the previous year. It means, global exports
practically reached the level of 2008 one year
after the crisis, in 2010. In the European
Union, exports in 2010 reached 97 per cent of
the level of 2008. Moreover, nine EU member
countries registered higher exports in 2010
than in 2008. Hungarian exports of 2010 also
approached the level of 2008 (98.4 per cent).
Substantial lag, as compared to the level of
2008, can only be identified in some countries
and for rather different reasons. Greece and
partly Italy have been struggling with structur-
al problems aggravated by Eurozone member-
ship for a considerable amount of time (there is
no possibility of devaluation of the national
currency). Completely different reasons –
needed for special analysis – led to a substantial
export decline in Denmark and, first of all, in
Finland. In contrast, Ireland, a „sick” member
of the Eurozone could once again reaffirm its
international competitiveness by exceeding
exports in 2010 by 5 per cent the level of 2008.
Also, it has to be noted that, among the EU-27,
Ireland’s exports were least affected by the cri-
sis (see Table 2).
The evident winner of the global economic
crisis has been a group of emerging developing
countries. Although this catching-up process
had started at least a decade ago, it was the
global economic crisis that manifested the
change in position (and in comparative statis-
tics) for key players of the international econ-
omy. The share of the developing countries
(including that of the emerging economies) in
global GDP (at purchasing power parity) first
exceeded that of the developed countries by 1
percentage point in 2010. This shift of power
will continue for the next decade in favour of
the developing countries. In 2020, the relation
may be 40 to 60 in favour of the latter. More
importantly, in 2020, measured at purchasing-
power parity, China may become the leading
country of the global economy (in fact, it over-
came Japan in 2010 and occupied the second
place next to the USA). The aggregated GDP
of Latin America and India may exceed that of
the USA and of the EU as well (see Table 3).
Therefore, developing countries (of course, not
all of them, but mainly those emerging coun-
tries that build on the high growth dynamism)
will be representing an ever growing share of
the GDP increment of the global economy.
According to estimates, their share may grow
up to 70–75 per cent of the total growth incre-
ment.
One of the uncertain or even alarming fac-
tors of short and medium term forecasting of
the global economy is the price rise of energy,
raw materials and food just at a crucial stage of
global (post) crisis management. This rising
trend is nurtured by several factors, with seri-
ous and longer term inflationary dangers for
the future of the global economy. First,
stronger demand is based on overall recovery.
Second, it has to be admitted that the key
emerging countries keep on generating large
demand for raw materials, energy and food
(products). Third, one should not neglect the
impact of the rising and structurally changing
demand of a large part of the population in
emerging countries. If, for instance, 100 mil-
lion Chinese citizens stop eating just vegeta-
bles and drinking tea, but start consuming
poultry and other commodities, the impact of
global demand on the respective products, and,
of course on their price, has a relevant impact.
Fourth, in a period of unprecedented low bank-
ing (deposit) interest rates and due to the PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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uncertain international financial environment,
huge savings (including speculative capital) are
flooding the commodity markets. This, again,
moves raw material and food prices upwards.
Last, but not least, the size of the available and
cultivable agricultural land is affected by incen-
tive programs for producing alternative (bio-
based) energy, some environmental considera-
tions and technological innovation linked to
genetically modified crops (GMOs). All devel-
opments indicate that each economic policy
decision, even those considered the most nec-
essary and rational at any given time, create not
only positive consequences but also negative
impacts in form of socio-economic „pollu-
tion”. As a result, the importance of impact
studies examining comprehensive interdiscipli-
nary and longer-term consequences has to be
upgraded in the future. In this context, the
majority of politicians and of the society will
have to learn the fundamental „lesson”, that
decision can never be based on (political and
economic) profit-maximalisation but only on
profit-optimalisation and not without clear
costs. In other words, it is impossible to carry
on in all areas a populist practice based on „I
will make everybody happy and you do not
have to do anything”. Such a practice will very
quickly strike back, while burdening the given
society with additional costs and the threat of
lasting lagging-behind.
Here is my last remark on global economic
Table 2
CRISIS AND RECOVERY OF EXPORTS
Country Euro billion Change 
2008 2009 2010 2010/2008*
EU-27 4.010.3 3.293.9 3.887.4 96.9
Belgium 323.3 265.2 310.9 96.2
Bulgaria 15.3 11.7 15.6 102.0
Czech Republic 99.4 81.0 100.3 100.9
Denmark 79.5 67.3 73.6 92.6
Germany 993.9 803.0 957.1 96.3
Estonia 8.4 6.5 8.8 104.8
Ireland 84.5 83.1 88.4 104.6
Greece 17.2 14.7 15.8 91.9
Spain 182.4 163.0 185.3 101.6
France 411.7 347.4 393.0 95.5
Italy 365.8 291.7 337.9 92.4
Hungary 73.2 59.5 72.0 98.4
Netherlands 430.4 357.0 432.1 100.4
Austria 123.0 98.2 115.0 93.5
Poland 114.3 97.9 117.5 102.8
Portugal 38.0 31.8 36.8 96.8
Romania 33.6 29.1 37.3 111.0
Slovenia 23.2 18.8 22.2 95.7
Slovakia 48.2 40.2 49.2 102.1
Finland 65.5 45.1 52.4 80.0
Sweden 124.6 93.9 119.7 96.1
UnitedK. 311.7 253.0 306.1 98.2
Source: IMF,WorldEconomicOutlook,May2011andowncalculations PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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processes. In fact, for some years, the crisis has
hidden the fact that short and longer term
development factors and tracks started to get
differentiated. Imminent crisis management
did crowd out a number of long-term key ques-
tions. However, they did not disappear from
the agenda of key global economic challenges.
Instead, they are waiting for urgent and reliable
(?) answers concerning our common future.
Sometimes, I think it is not feasible that, in the
global framework, many economists and politi-
cians are ready to organize knife-edge-debates
on next year’s growth of 2 or 2.1 per cent or
inflation of 4.2 or 4.4 per cent. At the same
time, decision makers absolutely forget to deal
with issues that can statistically be fully sup-
ported and will be influencing our future for
more than next year’s growth, budget deficit,
inflation, unemployment, current account bal-
ance, etc. Namely, the relevant demographic,
educational, health-related and labour market
processes can be predicted with a high level of
probability for the next 15 to 20 years. Their
management would definitely need adequate
economic and social policies not in the future
but just in the period of the crisis (which, of
course, „could not have been foreseen”). As an
example: everybody who was born in Hungary
or in any part of the world, will enter the labour
market in 20 years (the latest). Those at the age
of 45 will become pensioners within 20 to 25
years, with consequences not only for the
labour market and the pension fund, but, even
more, for the viability of the health care sys-
tem. It is more than striking (and shocking)
that (economic) policy-makers do not deal
with such issues at all or in a very superficial
way. Similarly longer-term challenges are posed
by climatic change and its potential impacts.
Being not an expert in this field, I only try to
follow the international discussion on the like-
ly contribution of the inhabitants of Earth to
this problem, and what is going ahead in the
universe surrounding us, without any possibil-
Table 3
GROWTH AND SHIFTING BALANCE OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC POWER
Region  Growth Distribution  Contributionto world GDP growth
or country 2010 2020 2010–2015* 2015–2020* 2000–2010 2010–2015 2015–2020
Advanced economies 49.6 39.4 1.8 2.2 0.9 0.9 0.9
• USA 18.2 14.9 2.1 2.3
• EU-15 17.6 13.3 1.3 1.7
• Japan 5.7 4.2 1.0 1.3
• others 8.1 7.0 2.9 2.7
Emerging and 
developing economies 50.4 60.0 6.3 6.3 2.8 3.3 3.6
• China 16.2 23.9 9.1 7.9
• India 5.3 8.0 8.3 9.1
• other Asia 5.1 5.7 5.1 6.0
• Latin Amerika 7.9 7.6 4.0 3.8
• MiddleEast 4.1 4.3 4.4 5.3
Africa 3.1 3.4 4.8 5.9
CEE 4.2 3.7 3.5 3.0
Russia, etc 4.5 4.0 3.2 3.1
* average annual growth  
Source: The Conference Board. Global Economic Outlook 2011. http://www.conference-board.org/data/globaloutlook.cfm PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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ity of us interfering. To be sure, we have to be
getting prepared for everything we can, and
both damage limitation and further damage
prevention must belong to our environmental
related priorities. In addition, a growing and
stressing social challenge in the next few years
has to be paid attention to. It may affect sever-
al countries, disregarding their level of eco-
nomic development and welfare. There seems
to be more argument in favour of the assump-
tion that the „social bomb” may explode earli-
er than the environmental bomb planned for
the next 15 to 30 years. Why do I think so?
First, the social and mental consequences of
the global crisis used to become evident when
almost all, but particularly politicians and eco-
nomic decision makers) believe that the crisis is
over, and, at least, according to statistical fig-
ures, growth has returned. Second, because
there is a rapidly growing gap between political
and economic „rationality”. In democratic
regimes, political rationality is limited to a
four-year (re)election cycle. Namely, a politi-
cian behaves rationally (although by far not
morally) when he/she can achieve re-election
for the next four-year cycle. In fact, political
and economic rationality can observe synchro-
nism as long as economic decision-making is
based on short-term and politically control-
lable decisions, so that all problems and con-
flicts can be successfully managed within the
given political cycle and mistakes be corrected
without questioning the re-election of the
given political „elite”. However, the reality is
different. At the beginning of the 21st century
both global and national challenges (not neces-
sary the solutions!) have emerged the required
eight, ten or fifteen (or even more) years to
manage and resolve . As a consequence, eco-
nomic rationality has to (should) move in a dif-
ferent track than political rationality. Until
now, this dilemma could not be successfully
answered in any country. All over the world,
but particularly in Europe, the basic precondi-
tion of providing a successful answer would be
based on the chosen values and longer-term
responsibility of the decision-makers, includ-
ing the responsible and conscious preparation
of societies for ever stronger external and inter-
nal challenges. It does not belong to the core
issue of this article to identify the current and
past) responsibility of different policy-makers
in this process.
CONSEQUENCES OF CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
To start with an introductory but fundamental
remark: in many policy areas we can and we are
right to criticize the European Union. Some of
these areas will be dealt with in the next para-
graphs. However, and most importantly, it shall
not be ignored that Hungary is a member of
the EU and as a highly external-economy-
dependent country; it is the European integra-
tion that determines its margin for manoeuvre.
In 2010, alongside several successful trade
reorientation efforts, 77per cent of Hungarian
exports were directed to the EU. At the same
time, the lion’s share of foreign direct invest-
ments came from EU countries. It means that
Hungary’s economic (and overall) policy
should not be directed against the EU. In turn,
Hungary, as a member of the EU, should make
the best choice of possibilities originating from
membership and the global role and influence
of the European integration. 
European reality in general, and the crisis
management of the last two years, in particular,
have been correctly characterized – both on the
level of the Union and of the Eurozone – by
the following statement: both the integration
and member states have been moving on the
path „from the impossible to the inevitable”. In
other words, the crisis has made all policy-mak-
ers aware of the fact that what might have been
„impossible” before the crisis became an PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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„inevitable reality” at present. Therefore, a new
quality of integration-level coordination has to
be implemented that necessarily and signifi-
cantly cuts classic nation-state competencies.
In addition, the European economic gover-
nance and its rapidly growing set of instru-
ments, let alone the legal, economic, institu-
tional and financial milestones set in order to
sustain the functioning of the Eurozone clearly
demonstrate that most member countries are
ready (or obliged) to consider previously
unforeseen compromises. Namely, it has
become obvious that any other step against the
mainstream would question the very existence
of the integration, with unpredictable econom-
ic and political consequences. On the one hand,
it can be taken for granted that most countries
have recognized the „inevitability” of a qualita-
tive jump. However, it is not yet sufficient to
trace the path – and even less the speed – of the
integration process. The shaping of the future
remains the challenge and the task of the next
few months, rather than the coming few years.
The current (post-crisis?) situation of the
European Union can be described as the „man-
agement of the costs of crisis management”.
This is where the EU is at the moment. No fur-
ther forward or back. Due to the applied
(mostly) national crisis management, most
member countries, not least those of the
Eurozone, have generated substantial budget
deficit. At first glance, it seemed to be
inevitable to mitigate or successfully remedy
the most burning problems of the crisis. As a
result, the budget deficit of the EU-27, at 2.4
per cent in 2008, well below the 3 per cent
Maastricht criterion, sprung to 6.8 per cent in
2009 and practically remained on the same level
in 2010, already in the „post-crisis” (6.4 per
cent). In 2010, three member countries report-
ed a budget deficit over 10 per cent of GDP ,
and another ten countries registered a deficit
between 5 per cent and 10 per cent. The
Hungarian budget deficit with 4.2 per cent of
GDP proved to be the seventh best among the
EU-27, however, still high enough to reinforce
the excessive deficit procedure.
A more problematic area is represented by
the increasing public debt of most member
countries, not least in those of the Eurozone.
In the latter group the Maastricht criterion of
60 per cent has been more significantly sur-
passed than in most non-Eurozone countries.
The Hungarian figure of 80 per cent of GDP is
evidently high and hardly sustainable.
However, in 2010 this was ranking 8th, or bet-
ter than that of Germany or France, let alone
the respective indicators for Greece, Italy (rep-
resenting a special category), or even that of
Portugal, Ireland and Belgium (see Table 4.). 
It is a fundamental question how the budget
deficit can be brought back to the less than the
3 per cent level. It seems, however, even more
important, how the high public debt can be
reduced in the framework of a sustainable eco-
nomic policy and in a credible and reliable form
also accepted by the international financial
markets from the current level to the
Maastricht indicator. Of course, it cannot be
achieved in a few years without facing cata-
strophic economic and social consequences. It
is not by chance, that the European
Commission’s proposal aims at reducing the
difference between the current level of public
debt and the 60 per cent prescribed by the
Maastricht agreement by 2 per cent each year.
This, in itself, seems to be a unique challenge,
even if the international financial markets were
ready to acknowledge this effort as lasting, sus-
tainable and reliable. Considering this uncer-
tainty, in theory, five possibilities can be con-
sidered for a substantial reduction of public
debt.
The first already belongs to the realm of
dreams. Its precondition would have been that
member country governments had not spent a
lot of money for short term crisis management
but for the construction of the future. In other PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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words, governments would not finance the
artificial maintenance of outdated structures –
from the car industry to the labour market –
but would have given clear priority to training,
education, development policy and innovation.
Unfortunately, with the rare exception of
Sweden, with a rather modest crisis manage-
ment policy, no country has embarked on this
way. 
The second and third options are based on
the well-known recommendations of the IMF,
where budget income has to be raised and
expenditure be reduced. However, at the begin-
ning of an anyhow fragile and modest recovery
raising tax incomes could jeopardize even the
uncertain recovery. Of course, expenditures
can be cut in various fields, not least in the area
of social welfare programs. But, where do we
Table 4
BUDGET DEFICIT AND PUBLIC DEBT OF SELECTED EU MEMBER COUNTRIES: 
FACTS (2008–2010) AND PROSPECTS (2011–2012)
Country Budget Deficit Public Debt
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2010 2012
EU-27 –2.4 –6.8 –6.4 –4.7 –3.8 62.3 80.2 83.3
Eurozone –2.0 – 6.3 – 6.0 – 4.3  – 3.5 69.9 85.4 88.5
Belgium –1.3 – 5.9 – 4.1 – 3.7 – 4.2 89.6 96.8 97.5
Bulgaria +1.7 –4.7 –3.2 –2.7 –1.6 13.7 16.2 18.6
Czech Republic –2.7 – 5.9 – 4.7 – 4.4 – 4.1 30.0 38.5 42.9
Denmark +3.2 – 2.7 – 2.7 – 4.1 – 3.2 34.5 43.6 47.1
Germany +0.1 – 3.0 – 3.3 – 2.0 – 1.2 66.3 83.2 81.1
Estonia –2.8 –1.7 +0.1 –0.6 –2.4 4.6 6.6 6.9
Ireland –7.3 –14.3 –32.4 –10.5 – 8.8 44.4 96.2 117.9
Greece –9.8 –15.4 –10.5 – 9.5 – 9.3 110.7 142.8 166.1
Spain –4.2 –11.1 – 9.2 – 6.3 –5.3 39.8 60.1 71.0
France –3.3 – 7.5 – 7.0 – 5.8 – 5.3 67.7 81.7 86.8
Italy –2.7 – 5.4 – 4.6 – 4.0  –3.2 106.3 119.0 119.8
Latvia –4.2 –9.7 –7.7 –4.5 –3.8 19.7 44.7 49.4
Lithuania –3.3 –9.5 –7.1 –5.5 –4.8 15.6 38.2 43.6
Hungary –3.7 – 4.5 –4.2 +1.6 – 3.3 72.3 80.2 72.7
Netherlands +0.6 – 5.5 – 5.4 – 3.7 – 2.3 58.2 62.7 64.0
Austria –0.9 – 4.1 – 4.6 – 3.7 – 3.3 63.8 72.3 75.4
Poland –3.7 – 7.3 – 7.9 – 5.8 – 3.6 47.1 55.0 55.1
Portugal –3.5 –10.1 – 9.1 – 5.9 – 4.5 71.6 93.0 107.4
Romania –5.7 –8.5 –6.4 –4.7 –3.6 13.4 30.8 34.8
Slovenia –1.8 – 6.0 – 5.6 – 5.8 – 5.0 21.9 38.0 46.0
Slovak R. –2.1 – 8.0 – 7.9 – 5.1 – 4.6 27.8 41.0 46.8
Finland +4.2 – 2.6 – 2.5 – 1.0 – 0.7 34.1 48.4 52.2
Sweden +2.2 – 0.7 – 0.0 + 0.9 + 2.0 38.8 39.8 33.4
United K. –5.0 –11.4 –10.4 – 8.6 – 7.0 54.4 80.0 87.9
As compared to
USA –6.2 –11.2 –11.2 –10.0 –8.6 71.5 92.0 102.4
Japan –2.2 –8.7 –9.3 –9.7 –9.8 195.0 223.1 242.1
Source: European Economic Forecast, Spring 2011 PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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find a politician who would be ready (and able)
to curtail social expenditure at the height of an
economic and social crisis. (Here, again, the
difference between political and economic
rationality becomes evident.)
There are two additional options. One year
ago, even the mentioning of both of them
would have been considered as an obvious
„heresy”. However, today, these options seem
to be far from being ruled out. I will address
these „choices” not because I would be glad to
make them happen. But, calculating the total
economic and social costs of different choices,
it still seems the second worst solution as it
allows a (large) part of the public debt to
inflate. The budget deficit of the United States,
which has been over 10per cent of GDP for
years now, as well as a decade-long current
account deficit, being financed by external
sources, cannot be maintained, even if the will-
ingness of external borrowers is not questioned
(however, it has been, most recently). One
should not forget the magnitude of this debt.
This 10per cent budget deficit is not the prod-
uct of a third-class small country, that certainly
would have serious consequences for its econ-
omy, but would otherwise leave the global
financial markets practically untouched. The
current US budget deficit equals one-third of
the annual GDP of Germany (or amounts to
ten years accumulated GDP of Hungary). This
huge debt can hardly be managed without mak-
ing use of two complementary instruments.
Both of them may seem highly unpleasant and
are likely to meet sharp criticism – but without
any efficient counterproposal they could be
introduced with the necessary level of socio-
political responsibility. One part is the con-
scious inflation of a larger part of the public
debt. We all know that inflation used to be fun-
damentally anti-social. However, drastic budg-
etary restraints may be more so. As long as the
negative impacts of inflation can be substantial-
ly weakened over a relatively short time (pro-
vided a reasonable economic and social policy),
the consequences of a self-imposed straight-
jacket, ignoring basic development and catch-
ing-up requirements and, not less importantly,
obvious social and domestic political barriers,
may damage future generations. The other part
consists of spreading the reduction of the abo-
lition of the public debt burden across a longer
period of time. This, of course, raises an inter-
generational issue. In order to implement such
a plan, it is necessary to sit down with respon-
sible representatives of the „younger genera-
tion”, and to come to an agreement that part of
the credit taken by the „older” generation will
be paid back by the „younger”. In other words,
an honest and sincere dialogue should be start-
ed as soon as possible.
There is, however, one addition pressure on
inflation, even if its appearance supported the
negative scenario. If, namely, some of the pub-
lic debt will be reduced by accelerated inflation
and this process will be overlapped by higher
energy, raw material and food prices, due to
raising global demand, and to several financial
market operations (including large-scale specu-
lation), and by growing social pressure for
higher wages (incomes), inflationary processes,
originating from different sources, may rein-
force each other. Such an inflationary pressure,
rooted in different factors, would definitely
need a new level of global economic coopera-
tion. Obviously, it would be desirable to avoid
the negative scenarios completely. Still I would
like to underline that a restrictive economic
policy, some countries may consider desirable
or obliged to insist on, would put more sub-
stantial limits to economic recovery both on
the national and the global level than a deliber-
ately accepted inflation that, hopefully could be
kept under control and would be spread over a
few years.
In the last two years, the reformulating of
the basic rules of the Eurozone became the
Achilles heel of the European Union. In this PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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context, really „revolutionary” changes took
place. The task of this article is not to provide
a detailed analysis of the steps undertaken. Still,
it has to be noted that some problems of 
the monetary integration seem to be managed
(or partly even remedied) by courageous
reform steps. However, the elimination of the
birth defects requires a completely new funda-
ment for the European Monetary Union.
Regrettably, this requirement cannot be side-
stepped either by the boldest amendments. The
currently (and partly still to be) renewed sys-
tem gives hope that the Maastricht criteria and
the reinforced Stability and Growth Pact will
be strictly observed without any exception
(previously granted particularly to the most
influential members). Although after heavy
convulsions, the contradiction between the
common currency and the common interest
rate policy (due to the different inflation rates
and real wage increase from country to coun-
try) seems to be corrected by the international
financial markets. Still, the relationship
between the monetary, the fiscal and the polit-
ical union seems to be wide open. Even in case
of a political union, an economic zone based on
common currency can only function if a fiscal
transfer system is implemented among the dif-
ferently developed regions (countries) of the
currency area. This is „normal” in the USA,
Canada, Germany, Austria, Spain, Belgium (all
of them federally organized countries), but also
in centrally administered countries as well (of
course, including Hungary, even if the instru-
ments may be different). Since, however, the
European integration is far away from a politi-
cal union, the urgent establishment of such a
transfer systems seems to be even more indis-
pensable. This seems to be the only way to
keep alive the Eurozone consisting of 17 coun-
tries with highly different production struc-
ture, economic development level and compet-
itiveness. On the one hand, the instrument of
the fiscal transfer would have a clear impact on
the common budget (financial framework) of
the EU. Namely, the discussion should not
start about 1per cent of the gross national
income of the member countries, but would
have to take into account a much higher
national contribution to the common budget.
On the other hand, it is obvious that such an
„alternative” would only be acceptable for the
net transfer contributors if they got an ade-
quate impact on shaping the economic policy
of the net beneficiary countries. This is, how-
ever, the point, where the establishment of
some kind of a political union is unavoidable.
Another solution would be the limitation of
the Eurozone to those members with similar
development level and international competi-
tiveness. This, however, could have unpre-
dictable implications not only for the future of
the Euro but it could quickly undermine even
the half-century architecture of the European
integration. 
Although not being the product of the crisis,
the crisis and its management have definitely
strengthened the need for a medium-term eco-
nomic strategy of the EU, including the cre-
ation of an adequate set of economic policy
instruments. In this context, several important
coordination endeavours can be registered (see,
first of all, the constantly widening package of
the European Economic Governance). In a
strategic aspect, the EU 2020 program deserves
some observations. In eventual overlapping
with the Hungarian EU Council Presidency,
starting at the beginning of 2011, the European
Commission has designed a ten-year strategy
focusing on increasing competitiveness of
Europe not only facing the challenge of the
United States but also of a growing number of
emerging economies as well. In the recent ini-
tial stage of the project it would be premature
to formulate any well-founded opinion on how
much and in what form the key objectives will
be fulfilled by 2020. There are, however, partic-
ularly in the first years of the program, some PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
372
framework conditions that cannot be ignored.
First of all, it has to be underlined that the first
years of the EU 2020 project will be character-
ized by the „management of the costs of crisis
management”. Is it possible to achieve sustain-
able and substantial growth in conditions when
in almost all member countries the fundamen-
tal economic policy goal includes the action
plan, which consists of reducing the budget
deficit and in halting or, in a more optimistic
scenario, even reversing the steady growth of
public debt? Will fiscal consolidation leave suf-
ficient room for strengthening competitive-
ness, transforming economic structures and
carrying out relevant shifts in the traditional
revenue and expenditure pattern of the nation-
al budgets within a relatively short time? To
what extent can growth be based on domestic
demand and on exports? Will future-oriented
investments start, which not only depend on
money (capital), but on the supply-side of the
labour market, as well as the regional and pro-
fessional mobility of the society (in the longer-
term the quality of education), and not least,
society’s willingness and capability to change.
The above questions do not rule out that in
some areas and in some member countries
progress in line with the EU 2020 objectives
could not be registered. However, on the level
of integration, two sources of danger can be
identified.
On the one hand, the interdependence
between the two key pillars of the EU 2020
program (namely growth and job creation) is
by far not clarified. (The same dilemma can be
formulated concerning the viability of one of
the key goals of the current Hungarian eco-
nomic policy, as well.) For 30 years we have
known that a competitive economy would not
risk its competitiveness, it needs an annual and
sustainable growth of 2 per cent to 2.5 per cent
in order to enlarge the absolute volume of the
labour market. Up to 2 per cent growth can
easily be generated by technological innovation
(without any new „technological revolution”),
adjustment capability of employers and
employees, new management methods, or, in
sum, productivity growth anyhow enforced by
growing international competition. Regrettably,
no medium term plan of the EU is based on
sustainable growth above or even reaching the
2per cent level (although, GDP growth in some
member countries, may substantially exceed
this limit). What can be done in such a situa-
tion? Obviously, the disposable labour (time)
volume can be distributed among more
employees. Part-time employment, work at
home, shorter labour week, etc. are well-known
„solutions”. This kind of flexibility may have
essential positive impacts on the labour market
and, not least, on the stability (or stabilization)
of the social structure of the given member
country. However, it should not be forgotten
that no or hardly any additional impact can be
generated on the disposable income, because –
on macro level – salaries and other benefits paid
for the employed people can hardly increase
the aggregate disposable income. In addition,
even successful job creation (or rising demand
volume on the labour market) cannot hide the
challenge of growing differentiation between
the really competitive, the potentially competi-
tive and the uncompetitive labour. Although
this is a worldwide phenomenon, it appears
with particular weight in several EU member
countries. In this situation, not only should
priority be given to education, training and
retraining, because it only affects the really
competitive and the potentially competitive
labour. All governments face a new reality of
what to do with the growing share of uncom-
petitive labour in all countries, when global
challenges of the 21st century give utmost pri-
ority to – sometimes merciless – competitive-
ness, provided a country wants to remain or
become part of the „modern international
economy”.
My second remark addresses the already PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
373
visible and potential future wedges within the
European integration. One wedge can be iden-
tified between the „old” and the „new” member
countries. At least temporarily, this wedge
seems to be less important today, both due to
the successful catching up of the new members
of the EU and, maybe even more, to the crisis
of the Mediterranean members of the
Eurozone. In fact, the majority of new coun-
tries have become fully-fledged members of the
European integration, even if membership
could not be transformed into a visible and
active policy-shaping role. However, most of
them could strengthen their position in inter-
national competition, became competitive
locations of transnational companies. In addi-
tion, the crisis did not only hit these countries
(Poland was the only new member that
achieved with positive growth rate during the
crisis in the EU-27). Regrettably, the elimina-
tion of decade (or sometimes century) long
stereotypes needs much more time and persist-
ent „enlightening” activities as well as honest
dialogue among governments (politicians) and
numerous groups of the societies. This task has
to be particularly stressed at a period when the
decade-long catching up process suffered a par-
ticular setback in the Baltic countries and
seems to be stopped in most others. In this
context, the discussion had started already
before the basic document of the European
Commission (June 2011) on the financial
framework between 2014 and 2020 was pub-
lished. Future destination (rationality) and
room of the cohesion policy, including its
financial instruments and new priorities bear
particular importance for overcoming the first
wedge.
Wedges manifests themselves much more
markedly in another field, not exempt of other
and partly new EU-specific stereotypes, name-
ly between the „lazy, utilitarian and parasitic
Southern” and „hard-working, economical and
rational Northern” societies. Although, until
now, the current discussion has been carried
out within the Eurozone, its impacts on the
EU-27 are evident or will become visible with-
in a short time.
There is, however, a third potential wedge.
At present, not even policy-oriented research
and forecasts pay attention to its eventual con-
sequences. The fact is that in the first two years
of the post-crisis period, the German and the
French „growth pattern” reveals substantial
differences. In 2010, Germany produced the
highest growth, about three times that of the
French economy. Evidently, this difference
does not deserve special attention if it charac-
terizes a one-year performance. However, if it
remains characteristic of the next 5 to 8 years,
similar problems (although in a different struc-
ture) may emerge, the Eurozone had already
been facing a problem concerning its sustain-
ability in a period of substantial widening of
the gap between „strong” and „weak” mem-
bers. An additional difference of 10 per cent to
15 per cent in the economic power of Germany
and France could substantially burden the
backbone of the European integration built on
Franco-German cooperation. In fact, the
potential wedge may be deeper than just the
difference in growth rates. Different growth
hides two different economic policy concepts
and different structures. They had been present
for a long time in the process of European inte-
gration. However, close economic and political
links, several times reinforced cooperation
despite all kind of difficulties as well as external
impacts felt by both countries kept differences
covered in the past. The current crisis has
brought this deeply rooted „gap” to the sur-
face. The export-oriented character of the
German economy, its global economic involve-
ment, the relevant role of small- and medium-
sized companies, the recently approved energy
strategy, the conscious selection of geographic
orientation of global and regional cooperation
(in the last years Central and Eastern Europe, PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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most recently China and partly Russia) funda-
mentally differ from the priorities of the
French „economic ideology”. It is an open
question how the European Union will be able
to manage Franco-German bilateral relations
that are (still) of fundamental importance for
the European integration, if the above men-
tioned differences remain lasting, its conse-
quences may produce a new wedge.
HUNGARY’S MARGIN FOR ECONOMIC
MANOEUVRE IN THE POST-CRISIS PERIOD
Neither the structure nor the limited size of
this article has the goal to provide a critical
analysis of the Hungarian crisis management
and the country’s post-crisis economic policy.
Here, exclusively some elements of the
manoeuvring of the Hungarian economy have
to be addressed. As an undisputable positive
development, Hungarian foreign trade outper-
formed all expectations, for the trade balance
registered a surplus of Euro 3.5 bn in the crisis
year of 2009 and of Euro 5.5 bn in 2010. Such
positive trade balance statistics have been
unknown in the last 30 years of Hungary’s eco-
nomic history. Despite all contrary evaluation
and critics, official statistics reinforce the fact
that the export sector representing about 70
per cent of GDP has preserved its internation-
al competitiveness during the crisis and in the
first post-crisis year. It is another question how
long this competitiveness can be sustained and,
more importantly, that the foundations of
future competitiveness should be created
today. There is no doubt that, also underpinned
by statistical figures, there is an evident duality
between the main geographic orientation of
exports and imports. However, this feature can
be identified in most small countries (not least
in China, as the second largest economy of the
world) that became an integral part of the glob-
al economy. The duality of geographic orienta-
tion means that exports are mainly oriented to
the European Union, while large part of the
substantial import content of export-oriented
growth originates in the Far East (manufac-
tured goods, spare parts, electronic accessories)
and in Russia (energy, partly raw materials),
respectively. This duality can best be observed
in Hungary’s export and import balance (sur-
plus vs. deficit) by regions and countries.  In
2010, trade with the EU produced a surplus of
more than Euro 10 bn, while trade outside the
EU registered a deficit of almost Euro 5 bn
(mainly due to deficits in trade with most Far
Eastern countries and with Russia). More than
„pure” economic aspects have to be taken into
account when statistical figures indicate that
the trade surplus of Hungary with Romania
and Slovakia precisely cover the trade deficit
with China, or that trade surplus with the
United Kingdom can easily cover deficit in
Hungary’s trade with Russia (see Table 5). Of
course, it is evident that foreign trade statistics
report on bilateral trade in the international
economy more and more dominated by pro-
duction and marketing organized by transna-
tional companies (according to reliable esti-
mates, these companies account for 60 per cent
of global trade). 
The interdependence of growth, exports and
domestic demand (stimulus) is rightly consid-
ered a fundamental economic strategy issue. In
other words, can domestic demand become the
decisive growth generating factor in the next
few years? Without forgetting the relevance of
the domestic market (in case of mainly domes-
tic market-oriented products and services),
post-crisis recovery has been everywhere unan-
imously supported by exports. Facts of 2010
and forecasts for the period until 2012, summa-
rized in Table 6 reveal a fundamental difference
between the dynamics of domestic demand and
of exports. In each „new” EU member country
disposing of limited domestic market
(demand), exports keep on playing a key, if not PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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Table 5
MAIN BILATERAL SURPLUS AND DEFICIT RELATIONS OF HUNGARY'S FOREIGN TRADE
(2010)
Country Surplus Euro mn Coverage* Country Deficit Euro mn Coverage*
United Kingdom 2.604 309.7 China 3.143 25.5
Romania 2.254 235.6 Russia 2.309 50.3
Spain 1.480 279.7 Rep. of Korea 1.774 10.2
Italy 1.175 142.8 Japan 911 31.7
Germany 1.175 145.6 Taiwan 869 6.3
France 1.147 144.3 Austria 503 86.1
Slovakia 1.118 105.7 Netherlands 410 84.6
Ukraine 796 238.4 Belgium 342 75.7
Croatia 618 347.2 Singapore 247 61.9
Serbia** 564 304.7 Poland 200 92.3
* exports/imports where imports are always 100
** excluding Kosovo
Source: Central Statistical Office and own calculations
Table 6
GROWTH OF REAL GDP, EXPORTS AND REAL PRIVATE CONSUMPTION IN NMS, 
WB AND CIS (PER CENT)
Country Real GDP Real GDP Exports Private Consumption
2009 2010/12* 2009 2010/12*
Bulgaria –5.5 6.8 –11.2 37.2 –7.6 6.5
Czech Republic –4.1 7.1 –10.8 38.4 –0.2 3.6
Estonia –13.9 10.4 –18.7 32.9 –18.8 2.9
Hungary –6.7 6.9 –9.6 35.3 –6.8 1.0
Latvia –18.0 7.1 –14.1 24.7 –24.1 7.0
Lithuania –14.7 10.0 –12.7 39.4 –17.7 0.7
Poland 1.7 11.6 –6.8 25.2 2.0 10.8
Romania –7.1 4.6 –5.3 33.8 –10.2 3.4
Slovakia –4.8 12.5 –15.9 34.6 0.3 5.9
Slovenia –8.1 5,7 –17.7 21.7 –0.8 3.9
NMS –3.5 9.0 –9.0 30.7 –3.1 6.4
WB –3.0 7.0 –12.8 33.1 –4.2 3.5
CIS Europe –8.2 14.3 –7.3 18.5 –5.7 18.4
• Russia –7.8 13.9 –4.7 17.1 –4.9 17.8
• Ukraine –14.8 14.2 –25.1 24.7 –13.9 19.9
Turkey –4.7 18.3 –5.3 15.6 –2.2 20.3
* cumulative growth for the three-year period
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 2011 and own calculations PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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an exclusive role in generating economic
growth between 2010 and 2012. This statement
holds even for the Polish economy, with the
lowest level of international openness and with
by far the highest domestic demand. Despite
the spectacular increase of domestic demand, a
unique feature in comparison with other new
member countries of the EU, Polish exports
are expected to grow two-and-a-half times
quicker than domestic demand does. In most
cases, the expected growth rate of exports is
sometimes more than ten times (!) higher than
that of the domestic demand (Czech Republic,
Estonia, Lithuania, Romania). Not surprising-
ly, Hungary also belongs to this group.
However, other examples can also be quoted.
In 2010, the outstanding German GDP growth
of 3.4 per cent originated in 80 per cent in
export growth. And, in this case, we have to do
with a domestic market of 80 million, hardly
comparable with the 10 million population of
Hungary, with much lower disposable income.
In China, ten years since the Communist Party
have been insisting on turning from export-ori-
ented to domestic demand-oriented growth.
Facts, however, contradict this expectation: in
2010, Chinese GDP grew by 10 per cent, while
exports skyrocketed by 32 per cent.
In 2009-2010, during the global crisis some
Hungarian (economic) policy makers also crit-
icised the previously pursued export-oriented
growth „model”. Reference was made on the
fact that the Hungarian economy is too open,
the structure of its production is faulty and
characterised by duality. I feel obliged to add
some  remarks to these criticisms, mainly due
to the evidence of foreign trade statistics of
2010, but also considering the fundamental
economic realities (in other words, Hungary’s
the margin for economic manoeuvre). In fact,
Hungarian economy is highly open, because 70
to 75 per cent of the GDP is exported.
However, openness (as a given fact) should not
be treated („remedied) by withdrawing into
our own shell (which, otherwise, does not
exist), since such an „approach” would almost
suddenly produce widespread welfare-reducing
effects. In turn, the correct behaviour is to
make increasing efforts to gain new markets.
Where are such possibilities offered? Not by
chance, almost everybody would immediately
mention China, Russia, the Western Balkan
countries and selected developing (emerging)
economies. All these markets undoubtedly
offer substantial export opportunities, in most
cases much larger ones than those to be the
comparably modest export potential of the
Hungarian economy, even if the latter could be
fully used. Concerning the recently widespread
„geographic reorientation euphoria” two
observations have to be made.
First, China is definitely a dynamic market
with extraordinary importance. In the last few
years, Hungarian exports to this country
(mostly those of transnational companies
located in Hungary) experienced a spectacular
growth. In 2010, Hungary’s exports to China
reached Euro 1.158 m (similar to exports to
Belgium and less than 6.5 per cent of exports to
Germany), or just 1.5 per cent of total exports.
Let us suppose that exports to China would be
doubled in the next two to three years (which
would certainly be desirable), while all other
exports stagnated (which, hopefully can be
ruled out). In such a hypothetic case, China’s
share in total Hungarian exports would reach 
3 per cent, while the share of the EU would
decline from the current 77 per cent to 75 per
cent. Therefore, it would not be harmful for
the Hungarian economy, if its decision-makers
could finally be aware of some of the funda-
mental differences in magnitude (basic mathe-
matics).
Second, much more attention should be
devoted to the cooperation with transnational
companies. A large part of Hungarian exports
has been marketed by these firms in different
parts of the world, not least in emerging PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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economies. I do not have any reliable statistics
about how many engines produced by AUDI
in Gyõr will be built into AUDI cars sold not
only in Germany, but from Brazil to Russia and
from South Africa to China, practically world-
wide.
The second critical observation refers to the
production and export structure, in other
words, the decade-long specialization pattern
of the Hungarian economy. To begin with, it
has to be underlined that the current structure
of the Hungarian exports is by far not bad. Just
the opposite, based on technological and pro-
ductivity indicators, it is generally more devel-
oped than that of most other Central and
Eastern European economies. Certainly, its
vulnerability to the crisis proved to be above
average (similar to the Czech or Slovak
exports). However, this fact can be explained
easily. The sharply declining demand (either
based on the reduced disposable income or the
unwillingness of money-holders to spend
more) most seriously hit the durable consumer
goods market (such as cars, telecommunication
and electronic devices) as compared to the
markets of primary (basic needs) commodities.
This (temporary) situation, however, must not
imply that, as of tomorrow, Hungary should
produce Vietnamese flip-flops – evidently, with
Vietnamese wages and Vietnamese living stan-
dard. (Otherwise such products could not be
competitive in any market.) In this context, it
is a key government task to increase the
domestic value added share of production that
has embedded Hungary in the international
production chain. This includes serious efforts
to replace part of the imported intermediate
goods incorporated in different final products
(both for exports and for domestic use) by
domestic production that proves competitive
in price, quality and delivery conditions
(export-oriented import substitution). This
would not only have additional positive impact
on the trade balance, but would favourably
influence employment, regional development,
genuine cooperation among large-scale and
small and medium sized firms. All in all, the
positive impact would be felt in the upgrading
of the production structure of the Hungarian
economy.
Finally, concerning duality, the management
of which is another key government level eco-
nomic policy task. It is a fundamentally incor-
rect and misleading approach to condemn,
curse, or even chase away foreign owned com-
panies in general, and transnational firms, in
particular. Representatives of such an ideology
should be aware of the fact that the conse-
quences could be much easier be digested by
these companies than by the Hungarian econo-
my. The real challenge consists in how the eco-
nomic policy of the Hungarian government
could contribute to creating a more organic
link between the efficient and competitive
small and medium sized companies on the one
hand, and the mainly foreign owned large com-
panies, on the other. The question of how EU
funds available for small and medium sized
companies should be used in the most conven-
ient way, has to be raised in this context. Such
areas include the development of competitive-
ness and export capabilities, genuine incorpora-
tion into the production, service and market-
ing, network of multinational companies in a
sustainable cooperation framework, and the
replacement of certain, currently imported,
commodities by competitive domestic produc-
tion.
Finally, two remarks on international com-
petitiveness, crucial for the sustainable devel-
opment of the Hungarian economy.
International competitiveness has several tradi-
tional factors, such as price, quality, delivery
time, reliability of the partner or, to a limited
extent and with provisional impacts, even
exchange-rate policy. However, utmost atten-
tion should be paid to the new elements of
global competition. They include the quality of PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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institutions, transparency of decisions, political
(and social) stability, reliability, sustainability
and predictability of key elements of the eco-
nomic policy, quality and speed of the decision-
making process, as well as the most efficient
use of available resources, including not only
natural resources but also human capital and
network capital. In all developed countries, the
shaping (sustaining) of competitiveness has
been fundamentally based on social dialogue,
social cohesion and solidarity, and not least, on
the future-orientedness of the respective socie-
ty. Irrespective of all current problems, Finland
and Ireland (let alone the successful countries
of the Far East) had developed a future-orient-
ed approach based on clear and solid funda-
ments, instead of going back into the (misty
and sometimes mystic) past. I would like to
stress: not only politics but the lion’s share of
the society has to develop a future-oriented
mentality and attitude. Not to mention the
international image-building of the given coun-
try in shaping the economic strategy, and not
least the predictability and credibility of poli-
tics and politicians (or of those who can be
considered responsible for such a goal).